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| 品牌 |
ABB |
型号 |
DSQC328 |
| 类型 |
DCS |
加工定制 |
否 |
| 是否进口 |
是 |
|
微电网是电力系统中最有前途的组成部分,能够确保为受自然灾害或人为事件影响的关键基础设施提供弹性能源服务。微电网可以与大规模输电/配电系统(宏电网)隔离开来,以便在宏电网发生停电时使用当地能源和配电系统向当地社区输送能源。在这种情况下,微电网可以被视为向关键基础设施提供能源的可用资源。在过去的二十年里,微电网的监测和控制研究一直在进行,以保护和提高社区的社会经济绩效。然而,越来越受到关注的是可能的网络物理威胁,这些威胁可能会破坏宏观电网为关键基础设施提供的能源服务,从而影响社区的复原力和可持续性。作为网络物理系统,微电网也不能幸免于这些威胁。先进的监测和控制对于微电网的实时运行至关重要,因此直接影响社区的复原力。监控的研究趋势最近已经从预测、状态估计和预测中的正常态势感知转变为异常分析和网络物理攻击检测,以支持弹性控制系统。为了响应估计或预测的事件,需要弹性控制系统以确保功率流并保证系统电压和频率稳定性。尽管这些监测和控制系统已经在配电和输电系统中进行了研究,但它们对微电网的适用性和挑战需要得到解决。至关重要的是,目前还没有一个被广泛接受的(共识)定义、分析方法和相关指标来一致地描述电网的弹性,尤其是微电网的弹性。这个问题与微电网的网络-社会-物理系统设计、监控和控制密切相关。因此,未来的研究应该考虑(1)网络物理态势感知和弹性控制系统来防范微电网的恶意活动,(2)需要一个标准化的弹性框架,在微电网的不同监控和控制层进行全面和一致的弹性研究,
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Microgrids are the most promising component of the power system capable of ensuring resilient energy services for critical infrastructure that is impacted by either natural disasters or man-made incidents. Microgrids can be isolated from large-scale power transmission/distribution systems (macrogrids) to deliver energy to their local communities using local energy resources and distribution systems when power outages occur in the macrogrids. In such situations, microgrids could be considered as the last available resource to provide energy to critical infrastructure. Research in monitoring and control of microgrids has been ongoing for the last two decades to protect and enhance communities’ socio-economic performance. However, of increasing concern are the possible cyber-physical threats that could disrupt the provision of macrogrids’ energy services to critical infrastructure and consequently impact the resilience and sustainability of communities. As cyber-physical systems, microgrids are not immune to these threats. Advanced monitoring and control are critical for real-time operations of microgrids and, therefore, directly influence communities’ resilience. Research trends in monitoring have recently shifted from normal situational awareness in forecasting, state estimation, and prediction to anomalies’ analysis and cyber-physical attacks’ detection to support resilient control systems. To respond to estimated or forecasted events, resilient control systems to ensure optimal power flow and guarantee system voltage and frequency stability are desired. Although these monitoring and control systems have been investigated in power distribution and transmission systems, their applicability to and challenges for microgrids need to be addressed. Critically, there is not yet a widely accepted (consensus) definition, analytical methods, and associated metrics to consistently describe the resilience of power grids, especially for microgrids. This issue is tightly related to cyber-social-physical system design, monitoring, and control of microgrids. Therefore, future research should consider (1) cyber-physical situational awareness and resilient control systems to guard against malicious activities for microgrids, (2) the need for a standardized resilience framework for comprehensive and consistent resilience research in different monitoring and control layers of microgrids, (3) distinguishing and clarifying the definition of resilience for microgrids versus for distribution and transmission systems, and (4) human behavior in the system monitoring and control designs.